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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the impact of internationalization on the financial
services policy subsystem in Canada. It uses subsystem adjustment as a
concept to bring some analytical clarity to how exogenous factors like
globalisation and international crises may impact existing policy regimes.
Based on examination of globalisation-induced banking deregulation
(–) and the current crisis of securitized banking, the paper argues
that the strength of this approach is that it integrates endogenous effects of
the existing subsystem in explaining policy changes in response to what are
normally treated as exogenous shocks. Careful effort needs to be made to
differentiate the processes of external systemic perturbations from subsystem
spillovers as these two processes of adjustment and policy change can lead to
different policymaking dynamics over the long term.
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Banking is a wonderful business to be in if you just don’t blow yourself up every
five to seven years.
Ed Clark, Toronto Dominion Bank President, .
Subsystem analysis and exogenous-driven policy change
Contemporary policy process scholarship is notable for two trends. A
range of approaches emphasize the importance of policy subsystems,
which tend to see policymaking in traditionally incremental terms, as
entrenched policy elites, variously seen as networks, communities etc.
promote stability in policy outcomes. These subsystem approaches have
been particularly popular in Canadian policy analysis (Skogstad ,
Coleman and Perl ). At the same time, there has been a tendency
in the last twenty years to see substantive policy change as being driven
by factors exogenous to the normal policymaking dynamics of a
subsystem – whether through social learning (Hall ), punctuated
equilibriums (Baumgartner and Jones ) or through some sort of
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exogenous systemic perturbation or shock (Howlett and Ramesh ).
Reconciling these two orthodox views is a kind of generalized Kuhnian
schema in which periods of subsystem normal politics promoting inertia
are punctured by these exogenous shocks which generate rapid policy
change and often reconfigurations of the policy subsystem itself. Prob-
lematically, aside from the fact that this places the drivers of substantive
policy change outside of the policy subsystem (and thus undermines the
value of the current obsession with subsystems) it has also led to a knee
jerk sense that the shock which disturbs normal politics in a policy
domain is exogenous. Basically, this crude schema has led scholars to
underplay the endogenous factors in a policy subsystem which impact
both the perception of the external shock, and the ultimate changes to the
policy regime that will emerge in response to that shock (Howlett and
Cashore, ). The nature of a punctuated equilibrium has a great deal
more to do with endogenous factors than is often suggested.
This paper explores this problem through subsystem adjustment
analysis: a proposed typology to clarify the interplay of factors associated
with globalisation (as a particular exogenous perturbation) and existing
policy subsystems in explaining policy change. In particular it explores
the differences between a systemic perturbation and a subsystem spill-
over, two types of subsystem adjustment in the Canadian financial
services sector. The paper argues that the strength of the subsystem
adjustment concept is that the nature of adjustment and policy change is
driven in part by considerations internal to the subsystem, the policy
goals of existing key actors, and their perceptions of the lessons provided
by exogenous developments. Careful effort needs to be made to differ-
entiate subsystem spillovers from systemic perturbations as these two
processes of adjustment and policy change can lead to different policy-
making dynamics over the long term.
Globalisation and subsystem adjustment – systemic perturbations and policy
spillovers
Many pieces on globalisation and public policy generally, and financial
services specifically, note that whatever the exogenous forces driving
policy change, ultimately domestic subsystems and domestic institutions
impact the specific policy responses to those forces (Skogstad ,
Bernstein and Cashore  and Quaglia ). However, there is little
in the way of a systematic analytical response to this problem. How do we
integrate macro social processes like globalisation and policy subsystem
considerations in explaining the nature of policy change? Howlett and
Ramesh () argue that globalisation has most commonly been seen as
a kind of intrusion of external elements into stable ‘homeostatic’ policy
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subsystems. However, they suggest that policy subsystems need to be
understood in an adaptive sense, in which these exogenous effects
stimulate subsystem change and reconfigure policymaking along lines
that vary from one setting to another, depending on the nature of the
existing subsystem. This requires the development of a subsystem adjust-
ment model if we want to understand the dynamics of policy change.
Howlett and Ramesh identify four types of subsystem adjustment where
considerations captured by the existing notions of a policy subsystem
interact with exogenous factors in producing new policy regimes. These
include, policy learning, venue change, systemic perturbations and subsystem
spillovers. In the case of policy learning (Heclo , Bennett ) and venue
change (Baumgartner and Jones , ) actors endogenous to the
existing subsystem use exogenous factors such as information gathered
from other jurisdictions or access to previously unavailable policy
forums/processes to pursue desired policy goals. In these cases, although
policy change relates to exogenous factors, it is immediately clear that
that change is initiated and subsequently managed in large part by the
goals and strategies of actors internal to the subsystem (See Table ).
External systemic perturbations and subsystem spillovers are more problem-
atic and require more case studies to illustrate the interactive effect of
globalisation and policy subsystems to explain patterns of policy
change – more effort is required to clearly distinguish and operationalize
these concepts. In particular more effort needs to made to tease out
hypotheses about how these two change processes will affect policy-
making over the long term.
None the less, systemic perturbations can be seen generally as external
events which draw new attention to a policy sector (Sabatier and Weible
). Normally this includes things like floods, changes in political
regimes, or in the case of financial services, financial crises. Such ‘Crises
afford enhanced opportunities to policymakers, because they are required
to look beyond routine and there is often not the time for extensive
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consultations or for opposition to change to build up’ (Howlett and
Ramesh ). Crises bring new actors or new ideas and policy goals to
the forefront of policymaking and can produce dynamic policy change.
While Howlett and Ramesh are not specific about these dynamics, it seems
clear that such a crisis can strengthen the hand of some actors to pursue
desired policy goals while weakening others. However crisis-generated
policy change need not alter the fundamental nature of the subsystem
over the long term as once a response to the crisis is generated, the basic
membership of the subsystem need not have been radically altered.
Subsystem spillovers are far more complex and there have been few
case studies exploring the dynamics of this type of subsystem adjustment.
Much like a systemic perturbation a subsystem spillover is generated by
exogenous factors. However these exogenous developments promote the
merging or integration of previously separate subsystems into a single
policy domain. An example might be when environment and industrial
policy interact in response to climate change concerns or aboriginal and
resource policy domains interact in response to legal questions of
aboriginal land rights. Effectively a spillover can produce an entirely new
‘uber’ policy subsystem in which there are now new institutions and a new
mix of actors – which in the short term should be conducive to policy
change. Unlike a systemic perturbation, policy struggles tend to still be
dominated by interested parties (rather than perhaps broad public
awareness related to the ‘crisis’), but by bringing together previously
separate subsystems, policymaking dynamics can be quite confused.
Three considerations seem important here. First, from a subsystem
adjustment perspective the pattern of policy change in each of these two
processes is still going to be highly dependent on the goals and strategies
of actors inside the subsystem. While these may be exogenously triggered
processes of policy change, ultimately it is the subsystem that adjusts to
produce policy responses and as researchers we need to avoid the
temptation to treat these event as ‘unusual shocks’ and therefore
exceptions to the ‘normal politics’ of the sector. It is often overlooked, but
as Nohrstedt () illustrates not all exogenous shocks lead to policy
change; and even in extremely important shocks (in his case, the impact
of Chernobyl on nuclear energy policy) policy responses have far more to
do with endogenous factors. To understand policy change we should
integrate factors associated with normal politics and the exogenous events
to try to predict likely patterns of response.
Second, it seems clear that if we follow Howlett and Ramesh’s logic,
these two types of exogenous-triggered change processes should produce
different long term outcomes. Where a systemic perturbation may result
in rapid policy change, over the long term existing subsystem actors may
continue to dominate policymaking. Essentially a perturbation can be
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seen as more of an opportunity for some of those actors to achieve
previously-unachievable goals (Howlett and Ramesh , see much of
the impact of globalisation in this light). A subsystem spillover will be
inherently more complex in that the membership of the policy subsystem
(indeed the basic policy domain) is more likely to be permanently altered.
Subsystem spillovers will likely introduce powerful new actors into a
reformed subsystem leading to unexpected policy squabbles as actors
struggle to control the agenda.
Third, in both processes we should see a ‘two stage’ pattern of response
to the exogenous factors. In the first phase the exogenous factors will
drive the policy agenda and rapid policy change may occur; however
there is an inevitable second phase in which actors in the subsystem settle
down into largely endogenous struggles over policy. Here the differences
between perturbations and spillovers should be most clear. A spillover, by
introducing a wider array of new actors and concerns is more likely to
lead to very different normal politics (in which the sector is notable for
substantial disagreement over basic policy goals). After a perturbation,
the return to the traditional normal politics should be more predictable.
Essentially the second phase in both processes will lead to new normal
politics equilibriums, but the equilibrium is harder to predict in the case
of a spillover because the policy domain and key subsystem participants
have been altered.
The Canadian financial services sector offers evidence of both a
subsystem spillover relating to the securitization and globalisation of
banking (–) and a systemic perturbation relating to the current
‘crisis of securitization’ in international banking (–). These events
offer an opportunity to assess the value of the subsystem adjustment
concept and whether subsystem spillovers and system perturbations do
produce different types of subsystem adjustment. Both illustrate the
principal merit of the subsystem adjustment concept: that policy change
is still heavily driven by the goals and strategies of actors inside the
subsystem – change is endogenous even in these instances.
Financial services globalisation and the deregulation of Canadian banking
Prior to the Mulroney Conservative Government’s decision to deregulate
the financial services industry in Canada, the sector was segmented into
several different industries. The mortgage and trust industry and the
securities industry were provincially regulated and outside of federal
jurisdiction. Banking, under the Constitution Act (), was a federal
jurisdiction. This segmentation, or system of ‘pillarization’, had been
developed to achieve a number of different policy goals – including the
availability of ample credit at the local (provincial) level (Harris ).
Exogenous Shocks in Subsystem Adjustment and Policy Change 
However it also established distinct policy domains for financial services
as federal policymaking focused almost exclusively on banking, while
policy change in the other sectors was handled by provincial authorities.
Thus, prior to deregulation Canada had a federal banking policy
subsystem.
Policymaking dynamics in the banking subsystem have been described
as ‘esoteric’ implying a highly closed policy community in which only the
leading industry participants, the ‘big banks’ and the Department of
Finance played a significant role in policymaking (Coleman ). Indeed
policy developments were guided by a close set of informal personal
relations between industry and government officials (Harris ) which
supported a tight consensus in policy goals. Prior to the late s only
small changes had been made to the regulatory environment in which
banks operated.
However, a series of market developments, many of them exogenous to
the Canadian regulatory environment, occurred in the s which
radically recast the policy demands of Canadian banks. First, the nature
of lending to corporate clients seeking capital fundamentally changed.
With the development of global financial markets, corporations seeking
finance were no longer limited to borrowing from a Canadian federally
regulated bank – cross border industrial financing boomed in the mid
s (Lutz ). A corporation could now seek lower cost capital in
international markets. This development was particularly problematic for
Canada’s banks as international financial service providers could provide
lower cost capital in part due to their ability to avoid domestic regulatory
burdens (like reserve requirements which impose a cost on a bank) and in
part because many of the providers were ‘non banks’ offering new
‘securitized’ forms of capital (Porter, , Strange , Morris ).
Thus domestic regulations like reserve requirements or regulatory rules
that prevented banks from becoming more directly involved in the issue,
trading and selling of securities had the potential to leave Canada’s banks
on the sidelines of global finance.
In addition, waves of mergers in the industry elsewhere were rapidly
increasing the size of financial services companies. The likelihood that
international trade rules would eventually require increased foreign bank
access to the Canadian market meant that Canadian banks would
eventually face direct competition, even for their domestic client base
with these emerging industry behemoths (Williams ).
In response to these developments Canadian banks demanded that
federal authorities drastically overhaul banking rules. They wanted the
right to become directly involved in the (provincially regulated) securities
industry. They wanted the right to become major players in the insurance
industry. They wanted a reduction in the burden of reserve requirements.
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Finally, they wanted a green light for industry conglomeration as they
wished to buy out the major securities and insurance firms and perhaps
even merge with one another to produce a small number of globally
competitive super banks. In short, they pressured for a major deregula-
tion and policy change in which prudential concerns (relating to the
safety and soundness of banks and financial services companies) and
issues of domestic industry competition and availability of credit would
take a back seat to building Canadian-based global banks. These changes
were seen as a necessary response to securitization (Morris ). They
would also be a massive benefit in the domestic market as the banks’
highly developed local branch structure would be a competitive asset if
those branches were, under new rules, allowed to sell securities and
insurance to bank clients (Tickell ). While the banks may have
wanted these kind of policy changes prior to these international devel-
opments, the advent of securitization and globalisation strengthened their
hand, making previously unachievable policy goals more plausible.
At the time these demands were pressed in  the federal govern-
ment was in the midst of dealing with two bank failures which raised
concerns about the effectiveness of Canadian regulators, a protracted
struggle with the provinces over who had the jurisdiction to regulate the
financial services sector, and was concerned about Canadian banks’
exposure to the LDC debt crisis. Despite these problems, given the
existing subsystem dynamics in which the big banks were dominant
players, the federal government made an ad hoc series of promises in 
to deliver on a comprehensive program of deregulation. The government
quickly passed legislation allowing federally regulated banks to enter the
securities industry, effectively expanding federal jurisdiction over the
sector, and promised that in  banks would be allowed similar
privileges in regards to the insurance industry. Bank Act changes in 
and  carried this program into effect. Without delving into the details
of the policy struggles involved it is important to recognize that the
federal government supported these initiatives because it shared the
banks’ assessment of the nature of the external challenges – deregulation
was seen as necessary to the competitiveness of Canada’s leading
financial services firms – the big five banks (Coleman and Porter ,
Darroch ,  and Roberge ). Indeed, on top of industry
deregulation, concerns about the inequity and unenforceability of reserve
requirements led the government, with little serious discussion, to support
the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision’s international guidelines
which replaced traditional reserve requirements with new, complex
capital adequacy standards that effectively lowered the prudential safety
net backing Canadian banks’ activities (see Porter , or Freedman and
Goodlet ).
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Post deregulation, banks emerged as the leading players in securitized
finance in Canada as they grew rapidly in size and profitability (Canada’s
banks quickly became the most profitable banks in the world based on
returns on equity). However the important point here from the perspec-
tive of the subsystem adjustment model is that this history underlines the
degree to which the politics of financial services deregulation were never
simply a question of ‘exogenous shocks’ and resulting policy change. The
challenges created by globalisation encouraged more cooperation be-
tween the government and major private market participants to respond
to the changing nature of the sector. Policy responses, however remained
very much a question of subsystem dynamics (Roberge, ). The banks
and the federal government quickly adopted a similar understanding of
the problem and a similar set of goals and thus perused one possible set
of policy responses. Perhaps more interestingly, the nature of these
changes triggered a subsystem spillover which had long term conse-
quences for policymaking in the sector. Deregulation in response to
‘globalisation’ initiated a second stage response in which its effects
subsequently complicated policymaking and led to a period of ‘politici-
zation’ and inertia in the sector.
Two step internationalization – the subsystem spillover in canadian financial
services
Since the decision to deregulate the financial services industry, policy-
making has become far more complex as policy debates became
increasingly ‘politicized’ after  (Harris , Williams ). Politi-
cization simply denotes the extent to which a number of previously
uninvolved, or unimportant, players have emerged as key stakeholders
leading to a far more open and public set of policy debates. By
precipitously expanding the powers of federally-regulated banks, the
federal government blurred the existing policy domains, leading to the
creation of a new policy subsystem – a Canadian financial services
subsystem which now includes not simply banks, the department of
finance and banking issues, but also includes traditionally provincially-
regulated securities and insurance firms, provincial governments them-
selves and a number of other new players that have taken advantage of
the opening generated by the struggles between these different groups to
advance their own agendas in the sector. The result has been a kind of
policy gridlock in which, despite some relatively small developments,
little serious policy change has been possible.
The expansion in the number of subsystem participants generated by
the spillover associated with deregulation has been particularly problem-
atic because a number of serious unresolved problems remained post
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deregulation, such as who, or what, would regulate Canada’s new
securities industry, now dominated by federal banks, what the regulatory
demarcation would be between banks and insurance companies, and
how much industry concentration would be permitted among banks and
among banks and leading insurance companies – the thorny ‘mergers
question’? On top of this many believed that the Office of the Superin-
tendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), which was created in  to
serve as the new prudential regulator of federally-regulated financial
services companies, was a weak under-resourced regulator which was not
up to the task of regulating the new financial services industry. At the
same time, the Bank of Canada has never taken an interest in playing a
role in financial services regulation (confidential interviews). None of
these concerns have been resolved in the almost twenty years since
deregulation, in large part because no consensus has been possible in the
new subsystem.
For example, since deregulation there have been consistent concerns
amongst bank observers that the standards that insure the capital
adequacy of banks are too weak and that there is a need for better
prudential regulation (Simmons , Strange, ), particularly sur-
rounding banks’ growing involvement in securities dealing and unsecured
derivatives and hedge fund trading. While these concerns seem all too
real in light of the ongoing subprime mortgage-generated crisis in the
U.S., even prior to this it has been clear that there were large risks in the
modern banking environment. For example, several large international
banks (including Barings PLC in  and the French bank SocGen in
) virtually collapsed as a result of what the industry refers to as ‘rogue
trading’, but which more properly should be seen as problems of
insufficient prudential oversight. What is worrying is that in both the
Barings PLC and SocGen cases the losses would have represented a
significant portion of the total equity of any of Canada’s banks. However,
Canadian banks and Department of Finance officials have been unwilling
to discuss the risks involved in the modern banking environment – despite
a similar ‘small’ recent case in which a ‘rogue’ securities trader at
Toronto Dominion defrauded the bank of $ million (CDN). Officials
have comfortably assumed that Canadian banks are now too big to fail,
a common perception in the Canadian industry.
While traditionally-powerful banking sector players like the banks
have been unwilling to discuss prudential problems and the need to
either ramp up Canada’s capital adequacy standards or improve the
supervisory capabilities of the OSFI, in the case of securities regulation
the problem has been the provinces. During deregulation the federal
government promised some sort of plan to regulate the new integrated
securities industry, and has continued to pursue a variety of strategies
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to get the provinces to agree to federally-coordinated reform of
securities regulation – indeed the federal government would like to
assert Constitutional jurisdiction over the sector. Many believed there
was considerable scope for misdeeds in the newly integrated industry
(Boreham , Babad and Mulroney  and Stewart, ). This
has been a view shared by consumer groups and industry lobbyists
who consistently argue that a single national securities regulator is
needed to ensure the safety of investors and of major financial services
firms. Whatever the day to day dynamics of this struggle, the problem
is essentially that the federal and provincial governments cannot agree
on the creation of a national regulator as the provinces have jealously
defended their remaining tenuous control over the securities industry
(Roberge ).
In the case of questions regarding the demarcation between insurance
and banking, the federal government had intended to allow banks not
only to own insurance company subsidiaries which they gained the power
to do in the  Bank Act changes, but that eventually banks would be
allowed to directly sell insurance ‘in branch’ as they now sell securities.
This has not occurred. Insurance companies, eager to defend their turf
have become powerful players in the policy subsystem blocking any
policy changes which would improve the competitive position of banks
relative to insurance companies. Despite several attempts to remove
restrictions on banks’ insurance dealings, it is still the case that while a
bank can sell insurance on line, if a customer is in the branch and wishes
to buy insurance from the bank, they must go home and call the bank as
these type of sales are still prohibited.
The evidence is similar on the ‘mergers question’. While the banks
have tried three times since  to jump start federal approval for
mergers amongst the big five banks, mergers they feel are necessary to be
competitive with larger banks elsewhere, these initiatives have also been
blocked. In the mergers case, the insurance industry has allied with
provincial governments, consumer groups and smaller financial service
providers to lobby against allowing ‘big to buy big’ in the banking sector.
Given the unpopularity of the banks (and their record profits and service
fees) these groups have succeeded in preventing any federal approval of
such an initiative (Williams ).
While the banks themselves have become embittered by the ‘gridlock’
in the sector which is stalling the finishing touches of deregulation, the
broader point is that the prospects for serious policy changes of any
nature have been poor, This emphasizes the second stage dynamics of a
subsystem spillover as the new mix of actors, pursuing competing and
irreconcilable agendas have been unable to reach a consensus supporting
regulatory reform.
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The US credit crunch – systemic perturbation and prospects for policy change in
Canada
In the race to put a name on the current financial crisis (such as the
‘Asian crisis’, the ‘dotcom crash’ etc.), The Economist presciently labeled
the fallout of the U.S. subprime mortgage market collapse as the ‘first
securitization crisis’. ‘First’ because without regulation it will happen
again and ‘securitization’ because effectively this is the first financial crisis
generated by the blurring of the boundaries between the securities
industry and the banking industry in the ’s, a blurring that has led to
‘. . . a complex interdependent system prone to conflicts of interest’ in
which ‘fraud has been rampant’ and bankers have been secure in the
knowledge that ‘someone else – borrowers, investors, taxpayers – would
end up bearing at least some of the losses.’ (Economist, ‘What went wrong’,
)
For banks, one of the major benefits of deregulation-enabled securiti-
zation is that it generated new ways to manage the bank’s portfolio
flexibly. A bank could offer loans like mortgages to a borrower, then
bundle that mortgage into a package of other financial assets, creating
asset backed securities (ABS) and then trade or sell these securities to
investors, bank clients or other banks. By doing this the pool of credit a
bank can offer borrowers becomes much larger, increasing commissions
and profits. As the current crisis has shown, other banks would often
purchase the ABS to take advantage of short term interest differentials or
to use them as security against other financial dealings. The total stock of
securitized loans going into the crisis is unknown, but official estimates
that they represent as much as USD $ Trillion in assets are widely cited
by industry participants.
From a regulatory perspective, aside from massively increased com-
plexity involved in banks’ trading of these instruments, the major
problem is prudential. It is much harder to assess the amount of risk a
bank’s portfolio is exposed to in this environment. The bank holding the
ABS no longer has the same direct relationship with its ‘borrowers’. The
original issuer of the ABS which perhaps made imprudent mortgage
loans in the U.S. market, no longer holds the paper. Instead it is now held
by a bank (or for that matter a consumer) that has insufficient information
to assess the safety of those loans. Furthermore the bank that now holds
the paper can make the situation far worse by borrowing or investing
against that ‘asset’ represented by the ABS. Thus once the ultimate
mortgage recipient becomes insolvent, through a chain reaction, a bank
which had nothing to do with the original transaction may find itself at
risk of collapse – provided its portfolio is not sufficiently diversified or it
has insufficient reserves of other kinds of ‘liquid assets’ – both conditions
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which are no longer ensured in the current loose regulatory framework.
These complex arrangements have ensured that the market is unable to
self regulate for risk as the distance between borrowers and lenders is so
great as to remove incentives for the issuers of ABS to make sure the
initial loan is sound (Mian and Sufi ).
The collapse of the US asset-backed securities, which initially fell by as
much as  per cent in value in late  and early , as many US
mortgages became untenable, has hit a number of international banks
hard as many were operating close to, or below, the lines of international
capital adequacy standards (their ‘core’, or safe, capital comprised of
shareholder equity and credit sound loans was too small a percentage
relative to the amount of riskier assets they were holding). Ultimately this
led banks in the spring and summer of  to huge writedowns, record
losses, and in some cases, to collapse.
In the US, for example, Citigroup, once the largest and most
profitable bank in the world, posted a staggering $· billion dollar
loss in the first quarter of , prompting the bank to lay off over
, staff. On top of this the bank was facing the prospect of having
to sell off $ billion in assets (almost half its assets under admin-
istration) if it hoped to achieve the kind of returns on equity it had
prior to the crisis – though it is not clear who will be lining up to
purchase the bank’s ‘underperforming’ assets. Wachovia (the fourth
largest bank in the US), posted and even-worse $· billion loss in the
second quarter of . More widely-publicized, Bear Stearns, a large
U.S. investment bank, simply collapsed, requiring a large government
financed (USD $ billion) takeover. Mortgage finance leaders Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, responsible for approximately $ Trillion
(USD) in mortgages, also required emergency government-funded
backing to stay afloat. Worse yet, Indy Mac Bancorp, under FBI
investigation for fraud relating to its securities trading, had to be taken
over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as it became
insolvent.
At the same time, in Europe, Swiss bank UBS, normally considered a
conservative institution focusing on wealth management, managed to
lose as much as $USD  billion on American mortgage backed ABS.
Subsequent investigation into the bank’s books revealed that it was an
aggressive expansion into unsecured trading of securities and commodi-
ties that led to the bank’s improper exposure to the US sub-prime
mortgage market. In Britain, Northern Rock’s situation was so bad that
a partner for a government-financed takeover could not be found in the
short term so the bank had to be nationalized. This meant the public was
theoretically responsible for Northern Rock’s  billion pounds in
liabilities.
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These were not isolated problems. Many major banks had to seek new
sources of emergency liquidity to insure their survival. Throughout the
summer of , central bankers eager to avoid a complete collapse were
forced to inject USD $’s of billions in liquidity into markets by
temporarily swapping bank assets (like the US-mortgage backed securi-
ties) for more liquid assets (like T-bills). This means the risks associated
with those assets have in part been temporarily transferred to central
banks and perhaps ultimately to taxpayers.
While the crisis is, and was, ongoing the IMF in its April  Global
Financial Stability Report, estimated that losses might be as much as $USD
 Trillion, of which bank asset writedowns could be about  per cent of
that figure. More to the point, as early as the summer of  it seemed
likely that the resulting credit crunch was contributing to the onset of a
global recession. Perhaps more important than the economic pain, at
least from the perspective of the financial services industry, is that the
ABS crisis became a powerful symbol of the need for global and national
regulatory reform. The failure was framed as systemic. Banks have been
shown to have engaged in ridiculously risky activities. Private rating
agencies have been shown to be understaffed institutions with little
research to back up the solid credit ratings they had been giving ABS and
industry/market self regulation appears to be unworkable.
International policy debate in response to the crisis
In  and  a number of central banks expressed concern with the
way that banks were engaged in risky, below appropriate interest rate
lending, but with the weakness of the Basel Capital Adequacy Standards,
banks were able to hide their level of exposure to risky liabilities off their
balance sheets. Thus once the scope of the problem was revealed in
, and banks required hundreds of billions in liquidity bailouts, policy
debate moved quickly towards how to increase the regulatory oversight
of global banking to prevent these problems in the future. In October
, the G asked the world Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to
investigate possible reforms to international banking regulations and
design a package of reforms which the G could then promote inter-
nationally.
The FSF report, released on April ,  (www.fsforum.org) recom-
mended significant regulatory reform. It argued that the Basel Capital
Adequacy Standards be amended to require larger capital reserves to
offset banks’ off balance sheet trading activities and their involvement in
ABS. Effectively, the FSF (apparently with the prior agreement of the
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision) conceded that the exiting
capital adequacy standards were insufficient for the prudent operation of
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banks. The FSF also recommended a host of national accountability and
transparency measures to increase the ability of national regulators and
bank shareholders to asses the risk level of a bank’s portfolio. In
particular, the FSF recommended that national regulators as well as
industry participants should all strengthen the amount of disclosure
surrounding securitized assets to allow more critical assessment. Under
the FSF’s proposals national regulators should be reformed, giving them
greater power to advise bank boards and investors of risky behavior by
management.
The FSF also recommended that central banks be given more power
to engage in asset swaps to ensure banks have liquidity in times of crisis.
In some countries (including Canada and the US) there have been
limitations on central bankers’ ability to ‘swap’ assets with a troubled
bank to ensure the bank can continue to do business. It seems what the
FSF was intending was a more formalized system of ‘swap’ arrangements,
than the ad hoc responses in Britain and the US early in .
The FSF’s recommendations echoed much of what has been said by
informed observers. Often cited George Sorros, analyzing the crisis,
argued that there was a need for better disclosure of banks’ financial
positions when dealing in the more complex securitized assets, but more
importantly that banks should be required to keep larger reserves against
risk from involvement in some of the more complex financial instruments
currently being traded. Indeed, the FSF recommendations were rapidly
endorsed by the G which intended the proposals to prompt national
regulatory reforms.
The FSF/G assessment of the crisis and its calls for what can only be
described as a re-regulation of the global banking industry generated a
great deal of ‘traction’ in policy circles. Several countries rapidly took
steps to reform their domestic regulatory structures to improve their
ability to monitor banks’ behavior. For example, in the US, the Bush
administration began to push the ‘Paulson Plan’ a program put forward
by the Treasury Department (which began work on the proposals before
the crisis – in early ) which proposed a massive overhaul of US
financial services regulation. In particular the plan would combine a
number of existing regulators under the Federal Reserve Board, which
would now have sole responsibility for being a ‘market stability regula-
tor’, while rules promoting consumer protection, and securities industry
conduct would also be tightened (Paulson, ). Given the spectacular
growth in size of most financial service firms over the last twenty years,
the risk of poor firm-specific risk management strategies leading to the
collapse of one of these institutions is simply unacceptable in the eyes of
many – including those in the industry. Indeed, the current crisis had
already (as of August , ) cost the US treasury at least $ billion in
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direct bailouts and several hundred billion in ‘stimulus payments’ to try
to restart the US economy while ensuring liquidity. Thus it was hardly
surprising that the crisis generated widespread calls for tighter regula-
tion. In response to private sector complaints that new regulations were
not necessary, even in the troubled US mortgage market, Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson stated simply, ‘The world has changed.’ The
attitude has been that banks cannot expect $’s of billions in bailouts
without accepting new regulatory oversight to prevent a repeat. Further-
more it is hard for banks eager to avoid new requirements to resist them
politically. Even the banks’ lobbyists, such as the industry-funded
Institute of International Finance, have conceded that banks’ existing
internal structures are inadequate to prevent unduly risky behavior.
When the crisis subsequently deepened in September of  –
perhaps one of the worst months ever in the financial services industry –
policy debate was interpreted by a short term focus on emergency crisis
management. When first every major Wall Street investment bank ran
into financial problems and second a global liquidity crisis threatened the
basic functioning of financial markets, policymakers around the world
were forced to focus on the problem of returning liquidity to the market.
In the US this meant that discussion of re-regulation took a back seat to
the proposed $ billion (USD) Troubled Asset Relief Program ‘bail out’ of
banks while elsewhere policymakers were forced into a variety of liquidity
injections to support troubled banks, including in some cases outright
nationalization. Nonetheless, as this paper goes to press, markets have
stabilized, the US election has been resolved, and attention has quickly
returned towards the organization of a major summit to discuss re-
regulation. While there seems to be an emerging divide between the US
and European officials over whether there is a need for a new inter-
national regulator of the industry or whether national regulators should
coordinate the implementation of tougher national standards, the sub-
stance of the policy proposals remains the same. There is widespread
support for strengthening capital adequacy standards, transparency
mechanisms and clear support for stronger regulation of the types of
securities created and traded in financial markets.
Subsystem adjustment in Canada
In terms of how the crisis has been framed in Canadian circles, it should
be noted that the direct financial impact on Canadian banks is still
unclear as the full ‘bottom line’ of ABS writedowns has not been assessed.
In Canada trading of ABS related to the US mortgage crisis (referred to
as Asset Backed Commercial Paper or ‘ABCP’) was quickly suspended
and the Canadian courts have still not approved an industry lead
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restructuring plan that would resolve the status of the assets. While
Canada’s banks were less exposed to the crisis than some American and
European banks, there will be ‘real pain’. The Canadian Imperial Bank
of Commerce (CIBC), one of the ‘big five’ Canadian banks reported
quarterly losses for the first time since the s LDC crisis after making
billions in write downs against devalued ABS it held. Much smaller
Coventree Inc, an investment dealer with $ billion in assets under
administration, will go bankrupt as soon as legal issues regarding its
ABCP holdings are resolved. Despite the more ‘muted’ nature of the
crisis in Canada, the ABCP issue nonetheless exposes, not only prudential
problems with banks being engaged in risky activity, but also problems
with Canadian securities regulation. Problems which the federal govern-
ment has been quick to seize on to advance its own policy goals.
Simply, major financial service companies currently hold as much as
$ Billion in devalued ABCP. One obvious result of this is that many
allege that Canadian regulators, and in particular, the OSFI, should have
been monitoring the banks’ holdings more closely – that this is evidence
of the ineffectiveness of the OSFI as a prudential regulator. These
allegations prompted the OSFI to ‘pass the buck’, as the current
superintendent publicly complained that some aspects of managing the
ABCP problem were not in her jurisdiction and that those concerns
should have been handled by the Ontario Securities Commission
(DeCloat ). In testimony before the House of Commons Finance
Committee, she frustrated MP’s by blithely insisting on the one hand that
because no major bank had collapsed that everything was working fine,
while on the other hand suggesting the problem areas were outside of her
jurisdiction. Essentially the OSFI argued that the crisis involved ‘non-
bank’ activities of banking(!) ; which highlights the regulatory lacunae left
over by deregulation in Canada. It is not clear, even to the regulators
themselves, who is responsible for maintaining the soundness of Cana-
dian financial institutions engaged in securities trading. Many Canadian
investors had bank-run securities firms recommend ABCPs to them.
Facing the prospect of those assets being lost, many launched complaints
with the Banking Ombudsman and with the Investment Dealers Associ-
ation. As has been noted by bank critics for some time, there is little
regulation in place to prevent banks from passing along risky securities to
their own securities clients which in turn limits the bank’s exposure to
losses (Stewart ). Politics aside, it is hard for many observers to not
see this crisis as evidence that not only does Canada need a stronger
prudential regulator than the OSFI, but that the absence of a national
securities regulator which sets clear rules governing how firms trade and
sell securities must be sorted out – even the regulators seem to agree.
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Finally, the crisis generated some concern about the Bank of Canada’s
(BoC) ability to affect monetary policy. In part driven by the desire to
limit growth in the value of the Canadian dollar and head off a recession
in Ontario, and in part to ensure the credit crunch does not stifle
economic growth the BoC has made a number of interest rate cuts since
the Fall of . However, private lenders who have usually moved
lock-step with BoC changes, did not follow the Bank’s lead in both
the Spring and Fall of . Exposed to potential writedowns on
ABCP, Canada’s banks have wanted to keep lending rates higher to
limit the impact of their loses on their overall financial position.
This prompted Bank of Canada Governor, Mark Carney, to publicly
question the effectiveness of the BoC’s control over Canadian monetary
policy.
Thus, there has been a marked ‘change in tone’ in Canada as
elsewhere as it is hard to escape the conclusion that the crisis shows the
need for clearer international and domestic regulations to manage risky
behavior by financial services companies. Indeed, federal officials led by
Finance Minister Jim Flaherty have seized on the crisis to advance their
own pre-existing agenda for strengthening the federal government’s
control over the sector. Thus much like the earlier perturbation that led
to deregulation in Canada, in this instance leading actors in the policy
subsystem have seen the exogenous developments as an opportunity to
advance previously unachievable policy goals.
As an example, in response to the G endorsement of the FSF
proposals to tighten national regulatory requirements for banks, in
particular that national prudential regulators be given more power to
investigate bank’s asset sheets, Flaherty called an extraordinary summit
of leading stakeholders in Canadian financial services in late April to
discuss policy reform (Perkins and Carmichael b). Mirroring the
older, pre-deregulation policymaking style, the summit included only the
most powerful participants, the Finance Minster, the Bank of Canada
Governor, the head of the OSFI and the heads of only Canada’s largest
financial services companies. The Canadian Bankers Association publicly
tried to frame the meeting as an information session since Canadian
banks were ‘in good shape’ and already responding to the situation
(Perkins ). Some complained that the minister was making a too
public-show of the event; however this underlines how serious Flaherty
has been about using the G initiative as a platform to close some of
Canada’s longstanding regulatory problems and expand his own juris-
diction. Behind closed doors, Flaherty used the meeting to discuss new
disclosure regulations, while in public he used the meeting as a platform
to re-launch Federal plans for a National Securities Regulator – an
initiative that has gone almost nowhere since .
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Policy change
While it is early to speculate on the full scope of reforms that will be
enacted in response to the crisis, a number of initiatives already seem
clear. Firstly, the government has already committed to ‘ramping up’ the
effectiveness of the OSFI, as the Superintendent has recently released
plans to significantly expand staff levels to improve its ability to
investigate things like risky commercial paper dealing and how such
behavior may be affecting federally-regulated institutions soundness
(OSFI ). Second, the government has also announced new, tighter
regulation of banks’ dealing of Principle Protected Notes (PPN’s). PPN’s
are baskets of financial instruments (stocks, commodities etc.) sold to an
investor in which the bank guarantees that the investor will not lose
money on the asset. Obviously such assets have recently become more
popular as an investment ‘safe haven’, but there has been no regulatory
oversight of these assets. PPN’s are extremely complicated instruments
for purchasers to assess, particularly since there is no effective require-
ment that banks disclose the nature of the underlying assets being sold to
investors. There have also been concerns expressed that there is no
regulation of the commissions and fees charged by the bank. Given
lessons from ABCP dealing the Finance Minister has promised rules to
regulate the dealing in these type of notes. Regulations had been
proposed in the past, but only after use of the instruments swelled in the
sub-prime mortgage crisis has the Department of Finance delivered on a
package of rules that are to become effective on July , . Canada’s
banks have publicly endorsed the initiative.
On securities regulation, Flaherty’s position throughout the crisis has
been that it directly illustrated the need for tighter national regulation of
the securities industry. In his public comments, Flaherty has noted that
he is in a particularly weak position relative to other countries to prevent
such problems as he is one of the few finance ministers that does not have
control over the regulation of that industry – even though the major
industry players that might be undermined by riskier behavior are
federally-regulated and insured institutions. In February, Flaherty had
tried to restart national securities regulation harmonization proposals by
appointing a panel to seek simplified rules. He used the summit in
response to the G initiative to try to drum up additional support. Indeed,
the prognosis for major federal-led-securities-regulation-reform is better
than it has ever been as support seems to have grown for a national
regulator. Flaherty’s position has received support from the Liberal
opposition in Ottawa and from some provincial players as well. For
example, in April the Ontario Attorney General’s office proposed
expanding its role in prosecuting illegal financial activities, directly
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suggesting that the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) was an
ineffective regulator. This may signal a change in policy in Ontario, in
which perhaps the OSC’s status as a virtual national securities regulator
might no longer be as important to the province as preventing financial
crime. It could help pave the way for a deal on securities regulation in
which the federal government ends up in the driver’s seat. Likewise
both industry participants, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
have lent support to creating a single national securities regulator in
Canada. Amidst the crisis, the IMF released a report on Canada’s
financial system arguing for a national securities regulator while lament-
ing the absence of any serious criminal apparatus to deal with financial
crime (IMF a). This report built on earlier IMF analyses that have
often singled out Canada as a particularly weak regulatory of illegal
financial services activities. Throughout the fall, an Expert Panel on
Securities Regulation, established by Flaherty has been refining legislative
proposals for strengthening the national regulator. Given the deepening
of the financial crisis over those months and the support leant to the
process by the Bank of Canada a national regulator seems a possibility for
the first time.
Finally, as part of the  budget implementation legislation (Bill
C-) the government hurriedly inserted and passed with little scrutiny
legislation that amended the Bank of Canada Act, giving the Bank of
Canada (BoC) more power and a more direct role in managing this type
of financial crisis. The new rules allow the BoC to accept a wider array
of financial instruments as deposits from banks. The intent of the rule
changes is to give the BoC more flexibility in responding to a crisis at one
of Canada’s banks by being able to swap risky securities threatening the
collapse of a bank for a more safe asset – as was suggested by the G/FSF
proposals. The changes make it easier for the BoC to bail out a bank;
however they also mean that the BoC could theoretically find itself
exposed to the kind of ABS meltdown we have just gone through,
perhaps requiring its own taxpayer-funded bailout.
The net effect of the current perturbation might well be to resolve
some of the policy problems left unresolved by the last major perturba-
tion in Canadian financial services, highlighting the extent to which
serious policy change is ultimately sparked by exogenous factors. None-
theless, consistent with the subsystem adjustment concept it is already
clear that preferred paths of policy change are being selected by actors in
the existing subsystem. At the very least the crisis has strengthened the
hand of the federal government in pursuing stronger national institutions
to regulate finance. Indeed, at the same time that the Federal government
is arguing for expanded federal control over the sector, it has argued in
international forums that there is not a need for a new international
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banking regulator to set more uniform standards. The apparent
hypocrisy in this position is best explained by the extent to which leading
subsystem participants in Canada see the crisis as an opportunity to
achieve pre-exiting policy goals. Policy change in the Canadian context
remains very endogenous.
Globalisation of financial services in many other jurisdictions has
tended to result in centralization of jurisdiction and regulatory responsi-
bility (Lutz . Roberge ) and the current crisis is likely to
accentuate that trend, particularly in Canada.
Conclusions
Two lessons can be drawn. First, while the spark that starts policy change
processes in both systemic perturbations and subsystem spillovers is
exogenous to the existing subsystem, in both cases policy change itself is
still largely influenced by factors normally thought to be endogenous to
the subsystem, the policy goals and strategies of key actors. In this sense
the subsystem adjustment concept offers an important corrective to the
tendency to treat exogenous shocks as complete breaks from normal
policymaking considerations in a sector. Second, careful effort needs to
be made to distinguish systemic perturbations from subsystem spillovers
as they generate different dynamics over the long term. Various types of
exogenous systemic perturbations have been seen as the most common
explanation of periods of policy change since Hall (), but far more
attention is needed to document the differences between these processes
and to develop hypotheses about their likely impact.
In particular, subsystem spillovers associated with factors like globali-
sation, need to be seen as a more specific category of exogenous
perturbation. The principal difference lies in the extent to which the
policy response to the exogenous shock results in substantial alterations to
the existing policy domain. In a subsystem spillover of the type which
occurred during the deregulation of financial services in Canada, the
result will be the entrance of new actors and new policy goals into a
reformed policy subsystem. Such a situation over the long term will
produce more confused policy struggles, lead to considerable inertia in
policy in the second stage of adjustment to the exogenous change, and
perhaps ultimately undermine the power of existing players to dominate
policy outcomes. A systemic perturbation that does not challenge the
boundaries of the existing domain, will generate different dynamics. The
major effect of the current crisis of securitization has been to strengthen
the position of the federal government in policy debate. Whatever the
ultimate regulatory changes in response, they are unlikely to expand the
policy domain. The current crisis has improved the Finance Minister’s
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ability to pursue pre-existing policy goals of asserting federal jurisdiction
over the industry. The resulting phase two, the ‘normal politics’ of this
sector, should reflect that fact.
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NOTES
. Clark was speaking at a conference hosted by the Swiss Bank UBS which has lost as much as
$-billion (U.S.) in writedowns associated with the fallout from the US subprime mortgage crisis.
Quoted in Perkins (b).
. Howlett and Ramesh’s reasoning on these spillover-specific phase two effects needs further
development. While they correctly suggest that in phase two ‘stability processes’ will trounce
‘change processes’ and normal policy making will once again become more incremental, they do
not fully tease out hypotheses about what this normal politics equilibrium might look like. However,
logically, collapsing the boundaries of previously discrete subsystems governed by different policy
paradigms should produce a particular pattern of normal politics; one in which inertia is more likely
because the number of ‘veto players’ will have increased, and because significant confusion may
exist for some time about basic policy goals.
. Narrowly, the process of securitization refers to the creation of financial products that combine a
range of financial assets for direct marketing to clients as securities. In international banking this
term is used to describe banks’ diversification of their product base to include these forms of
financial instruments. Securitized assets can be sold to clients generating a larger pool of capital that
might be available from traditional bank deposits. Securitization allowed traditional banks to
compete with the emerging international securities trading sector (for example Wall street
‘investment banks’). However, this blurring of the boundaries between the securities industry and
banking has important implications. Traditionally banks intermediated between lenders and
borrowers. Banks lent money to borrowers without depositors directly risking their savings.
Securitized finance is disintermediated as the purchasers of the securities are effectively lending
money directly to the issuer of the security. Unlike traditional banking, their own money is directly
at risk. While securitization was good for banks – banks gained assets under administration,
generated profits from commissions on the sale of securitized assets and avoided the costs of
traditional reserve requirements – securitization created new risk for consumers of financial
services.
. It should be noted that these remaining regulatory ‘problems’ in Canada were not unique.
European regulatory reform also proved difficult given the post-s deregulation complexities of
a globalised industry and multilevel governance. See for example De Visscher, Maiscocq, and
Varone ().
. When the federal government allowed federally-regulated banks into the securities business they
claimed the Constitution was fuzzy on the issue. Federal authorities maintain to this day that the
Constitution could actually be interpreted as giving the federal government the power to regulate the
sector. See Gray and Kitching ().
. See for example, PDAC, ‘Position on securities reform in Canada (May )’, www.pdac.ca
. Because of the continued regulatory impasse the banks have had to restructure the physical
architecture of their branches to be able to provide insurance, if not ‘in branch’ then ‘adjacent
to the branch’. RBC, eager to get into the $ trillion (CDN) consumer insurance industry has
begun to open conjoined RBC bank and RBC insurance branches. Under this system a
customer in the bank branch can be asked to step through the doors into the adjacent insurance
branch, if they wish to purchase an insurance product. See Globe and Mail, Report on Business
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Weekend, Saturday, April , . These developments have been discussed for some time
by banking industry lobbyists, though most expected the regulatory obstacles would be
removed sometime ago, preempting the need for the special branches (Source: Confidential
Interviews).
. Much of banks’ frustrations stems from their belief that they mistakenly ‘bet’ on domestic
deregulation and conglomeration as a business strategy, but the government never fully delivered
on the promises of the deregulatory period (Source: Confidential interviews).
. Citigroup’s financial problems have been well documented in the business press. See for example
Read ().
. Economist, ‘Wealth mismanagement,’ April , .
. At the point it was nationalized, Northern Rock already had been loaned  billion pounds by the
British Treasury to stay afloat. The nationalization has resulted in  billion pounds of private debt
being transferred to taxpayer-funded public debt at least for the time being.
. Economist, ‘Providing Cover’, April , .
. While this was once an allegation made only by critical scholars, and widely ignored by
policymakers, it is now an accepted fact in the industry that the old standards did not work to ensure
prudential goals. See for example, The Economist, ‘Bank Capital: Joseph and the amazing
technicalities,’ April , .
. See interview: ‘Euro can’t replace greenback: Soros’ Reuters, April , .
. This is clear in the business press for example. Sources usually notable for the pro-market,
pro deregulation orientations to financial services, have rejected banks’ calls for more self regulation
and voluntary codes as a way to prevent a repeat of the crisis as insufficient. Indeed, banking
industry lobbyists have been sidelined in both the G discussions and the debate about regulatory
reform in the US. While complaining that new regulations were unnecessary, the debate simply
moved past them. See for example, Drohan (), Perkins and Carmichael (), and McKenna
().
. Quoted from McKenna ().
. See for example Institute of International Finance, Final Report of IIF Committee on Market Best
Practices – Principles of Conduct and Best Practices Recommendations, July .
. This has understandably reinforced a sense that ‘everything is all right in Canada’. Although, the
important point from a regulatory perspective is that there were no limits in place which would have
prevented Canadian banks from over-exposing themselves to US mortgage backed securities as
other banks did. It was simply lucky that they did not.
. See Standing Committee on Finance, Evidence, Monday June , . House of Commons,
th Parliament, nd Session.
. See Carney’s testimony to the Senate Banking Committee, Standing Senate Committee on
Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, May , . Senate, th Parliament, nd Session.
. See for example, Carmichael ().
. For Flaherty’s most pointed comments on the issue see, Perkins (c).
. See for discussion, Howlett and Macfarland ().
. In the meantime, provincial securities regulators have been all to silent on the issue – in large part
because their handling of the ABCP issue illustrates that a national regulator is needed and that the
defense of provincial jurisdiction has been a mistake. For example, the Ontario Securities
Commission removed existing restrictions on ABCP dealing in , in large part because several
smaller provinces had no rules. Provincial control over securities rules effectively means no rules.
Defending this status quo is not a winning argument in the current crisis.
. Recently retired Bank of Canada Governor David Dodge, echoing Alan Greenspan’s mea culpa that
central bankers had put to much faith in self regulation, has publicly argued that some of the
securities being traded by banks are ‘ridiculous’ and leant his support to tougher regulation of the
industry in Canada. See McNish (). While the bank of Canada has tried to officially avoid
taking sides on the national regulator debate, the current governor has consistently argued that the
status quo is unacceptable.
. There is considerable confusion about the meaning of this initiative as some have misconstrued this
change as not simply being an attempt to widen the crisis management tools of the bank. See for
example, Schoffield (). However, the context is clear. Officials in the US and Britain have both
found it necessary to temporarily swap asset backed paper held by banks for safer instruments to
insure that those banks remain liquid. The BoC has done likewise offering about CDN $ billion
in these type of swaps. Clearly the bank would like the latitude to do more in the event that one
of Canada’s big banks’ was facing a Bear Stearns-like situation.
 Williams
. Canada’s government has publicly argued against European proposals for a new international
banking regulator. See, McCarthy ().
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